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ABSTRACT 
This work assesses the impact of the minimum wage on youth employment, 
unemployment and education enrolment in Spain. Using a difference-in-
differences approach, we take advantage of the fact that the minimum wage 
for people aged 16 and 17 years old, which was approximately two thirds 
the level of the standard minimum wage, was raised to reach full 
convergence with the latter in a period of three years (from 1995 to 1998). 
The empirical analysis suggests that this policy intervention depressed the 
employment levels of the affected group, raised unemployment among them 
and decreased the probability of remaining in formal education. 
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The research on the impact of a minimum wage (MW) on labour 
market performance has a long tradition in labour economics and to this day 
continues to be at the core of the debate on labour market interventions, 
with a myriad of works dealing with the effects of MW on different 
outcomes, from employment and unemployment to human capital 
formation. In spite of the vast amount of empirical evidence gathered on this 
issue, there is still no consensus as to the impact of MW on the labour 
market and especially on the magnitude of such effects.1 The main aim of 
this article is to contribute to this body of literature by providing empirical 
evidence on the impact of the increase in youth MW on the behaviour of 
employment, unemployment and education enrolment among youth in Spain 
during the 90s. We benefit from a natural experiment consisting of the fact 
that the minimum wage for people aged 16 and 17, far below the standard 
minimum wage, was raised to reach full convergence with the latter over a 
period of three years (from 1995 to 1998). Using a difference-in-differences 
methodology, we find that this policy reduced employment by around 3 
percentage points, raised unemployment by roughly 2 percentage points and 
depressed the probability of being at school by around 1.5 points.   
The article unfolds in five parts that follow this introduction. In the 





submit a detailed account of the rise in the MW and present a brief literature 
review on this issue in Spain and other relevant countries where similar 
changes were adopted. The third section describes the main features of the 
database used in the empirical work, while the fourth explains the 
methodology followed for evaluating the impact of the rise in MW. The 
main results of the analysis are presented in the sixth section. The last 
section, as usual, summarises and discusses the main conclusions of the 
article. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Rationale for a different and lower minimum wage for youth. 
The existence of a differentiated lower minimum wage for young 
workers can be defended from two different perspectives (Marinakis 2007). 
From the demand side, it can be argued that young workers will most likely 
have lower productivity than older workers with longer work experience 
and on the job training. If that is the case, having a single MW for workers 
notwithstanding their age would penalize the group of young workers as, for 
the same wage, instead of younger workers firms would demand older 
workers with higher productivity2. From a different perspective, the higher 
the minimum wage for young workers the higher the incentive for young 





in the EU, for example, finishing higher secondary education is a goal worth 
pursuing3, a low youth minimum wage in comparison to the adult MW 
would penalize leaving school early.  
As we can see in Table 1, most high income countries with 
Minimum Wage Legislation have a separate lower MW for young workers, 
although the different cases vary. In some countries -Australia, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, the UK and, notably, the Netherlands - the MW rises with age 
until it converges with the adult MW from a given age: 18 in Luxemburg, 
21 in the UK, Belgium and Australia and 23 in the Netherlands. In another 
set of countries - Korea, the USA, France, Ireland and the Czech Republic - 
the MW rate is related to both tenure in the job and age. A third group of 
countries have a single lower MW for workers under a given age. Finally, 
Canada, Spain, New Zealand and Portugal, after a period of enforcing 
different MW for different age groups, opted for a single MW regardless of 
age. There are also wide differences in terms of the age-related minimum 
wage differentials, ranging from 10% in the cases of Korea and the USA (as 
well as in Australia for those 20 years old) to as much as 70% for 15 year 
olds in the Netherlands. 







2.2. The Spanish case 
Minimum Wage legislation in Spain dates to 1963. In the beginning, 
MW legislation envisaged lower wages for young workers, although the 
number of sub-minimum wages changed with the modernization of Spanish 
labour law (including rising the minimum employment age to 16 in 1978). 
By 1980 there were two sub-wages for young workers, one for workers aged 
16 (38% of the standard MW) and another for workers aged 17 (61% of the 
standard MW).  In 1990, the specific wage for workers aged 16 was 
eliminated, leaving a single sub-wage of 65% of the standard MW for all 
workers under 18. This change implied an increase of 83% in the MW for 
workers under 17. Finally, in 1995, one year before the general elections, 
the Socialist Government decided to merge the youth MW with the standard 
MW in a three year process. This decision (honoured by the subsequent 
conservative government) produced a major rise of 64 % in the MW for 
young workers over a three year period (Table 2). We have tracked Spanish 
newspapers of the time in order to determine whether this policy measure 
was announced in advance by the executive (in which case the effect of the 
rise in the MW could have been anticipated in some way by employers), but 
we could not find any reference to it in the main national media previous to 
its approval. Therefore, to our knowledge, this intervention could 





This change took place in a context of high employment growth, but 
also of a high unemployment rate as a result of the 1993 economic crisis, 
with a total unemployment rate of 23% and a youth unemployment rate (16-
19) of 50%.  At that time, as well as now, Spain had a relatively low 
minimum wage (35% of average wage) compared to other EU countries 
(Czech 2009). 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Several economic studies have explored the impact of the MW on 
employment in Spain with, as often happens in the international literature on 
the topic, conflicting results. For example, Dolado et al. (1996), using a 
panel of six sectors over the period prior to the elimination of the youth rate 
1967-94, conclude that a MW tended to reduce youth employment but to 
raise the employment of older workers. A similar result is obtained from the 
analysis performed by these authors regarding the impact of the above-
mentioned merger of MW for workers under 16 and 17 in 1990. The papers 
by Pérez et al. (2002) and González et al. (2003), focused on youth 
employment, conclude using different approaches that there is a negative, if 
weak, impact of MW on employment. More recently, Blazquez et al. (2009) 
find no strong evidence of the existence of a negative effect of MW on 
youth employment rates for the period 200-2008. Finally, Cebrián et al. 
(2010), report on a little used data base (Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral) to 





The authors conclude that the intense increase in MW that took place in the 
period 2000-2008 (a 41.2% increase in MW and a 6.4 % increase in the 
Katz Index) had a negative impact on employment of nearly 5%, mostly 
explained by the transmission of such increases to the overall wage 
architecture. 
2.3. Similar experiences in other countries: Portugal and New Zealand. 
Two international experiences of changes in youth MW, similar to 
the ones described for Spain, are relevant to the analysis presented in this 
paper.  In 2001, the New Zealand MW for youth underwent a dual reform. 
Firstly, the threshold marking the standard MW was reduced by two years, 
from 20 to 18 years old. Secondly, the youth MW for workers 16 and 17 
years old was raised in two steps to 80% of the standard MW (instead of the 
previous 60%). These changes meant a wage increase of 69% for the former 
group of workers (aged 18 and 19), and an increase of 41% for workers 
aged 16-17.  Hyslop and Stillman (2007), using a methodology of 
difference-in-differences,  do not find evidence of an adverse impact of the 
MW rise on youth employment in the two years immediately following the 
reform, although they find weak evidence of employment loss by the third 
year.  Their combined analysis of change in employment and working hours 
allows them to conclude that the rise the youth MW produced a reduction in 
the total youth-adult labour earning gap. In contrast, the authors present 





youth unemployment, suggesting that the increase in labour supply 
associated with the increase in youth MW was not matched by a 
corresponding increase in youth labour demand. 
The second case study refers to a country much closer to Spain, 
Portugal.  The Portuguese MW was not created until the overthrow of the 
Salazar Dictatorship in 1974. In 1986, in order to adapt the existing youth 
sub-minimum wage to the complete recognition of age 18 as the age of full 
rights and duties of Portuguese citizens, there was a major change in the 
structure of the sub-minimum wage consisting of the following: (1)  workers 
were entitled to the standard MW as from age 18 (instead of the previous 
20), leading to an increase of 49.3% in MW; (2) workers under 18 were 
entitled to 75% of the standard rate (instead of the previous 50%).  Pereira 
(2003) focuses on the former group, using a 5 year panel of firm data to 
study the impact of the rise in MW on the employment of workers aged 18-
19, and on slightly older workers (20-25), who can be considered as 
substitutes to the group targeted by the reform. According to this author, the 
increase in MW significantly reduced employment of workers 18 and 19 
years old, with estimated employment-MW elasticity in the range of -0.2 to 
-0.4. The author also observes the existence of a substitution effect towards 







The analysis presented below is based on the Economically Active 
Population Survey (EAPS), the Spanish labour force survey carried out in 
Spain by the National Statistics Institute starting in the 60s. This database 
comprises a large sample of households and includes the main socio-
demographic characteristics of their members. Unfortunately, there is no 
information available on workers’ earnings. At the time of the period of 
analysis (1995-1998) the survey was carried out on a quarterly basis and had 
a two-stage stratified sampling. However, only probabilistic weights for 
correcting for the different probability of selection of households are 
provided to researchers and, hence, fully taken into account in the analysis. 4 
 The sample used in the analysis comprises the cross-sectional data 
corresponding to the four quarters of the year 1995 (before the policy 
change) and the year 1998 (the first year with an equal MW for teenagers 
and the rest of population). As the National Statistics Institute freely offers a 
standard extraction of the EAPS only since 1999, we asked for a customized 
sample for the period of analysis that would allow us to disaggregate the age 
of individuals year by year (the standard extraction only codes age in five-
year groups). Overall, our sample comprises more than 48,000 observations 
of individuals aged 16 or 17 (of whom more than 3,500 are employed and 





and 20 years old (although, as explained below, we use two different control 
groups in order to check the robustness of the results). This second group 
shows employment rates and unemployment rates higher and lower than the 
treated group, respectively.  
 All the data analysis was performed using the Stata 11.1 software. 
All data and programs are available from the authors upon request.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The estimation of the impact of the increase in youth MW on 
employment, unemployment and school enrolment is carried out following a 
difference-in-differences approach, where the treated group is the 
population aged 16 and 17 and young individuals aged between 18 and 20 
years old are considered as the control group. The identifying assumption is 
that both groups is that both groups would have followed the same trend in 
absence of the policy change (the parallel trend assumption). As mentioned 
above, we examine the effects of the rise in youth MW on employment, 
unemployment, training and school enrolment. 
As is well-known, consistency of estimated parameters in linear 
probability models (LPM) requires considerably less strong assumptions 





assumptions are satisfied. On this basis, some authors, such as Angrist and 
Pischke (2009), suggest relying on LPM estimates over the other options. 
Nevertheless, when possible, we perform the estimations using both types of 
procedures in order to test the robustness of the analysis.  
 Aiming to estimate the impact of the MW on employment, we 
initially estimate the following linear model:  
  [1] 
Where Eit is a dummy capturing whether individual i at time t is employed 
or not; D98it is a fictitious variable that takes the value 0 before 1998 and 1 
in 1998; D16_17it is a dummy indicating whether the individual belongs to 
the population aged 16-17; is captured by another dummy, treatment,  taking 
the value 1 for individuals aged 16 or 17 in 1998, Xit is a vector containing 
socio-economic variables (an intercept, individual characteristics and 
regional and quarter dummies) and, lastly, εit is disturbance with mean zero. 
The estimation of β yields the effect of treatment on the treated (ETT). 
Analogously, we also carry out the estimation using the following probit 
model: 
  [2] 
where pit is the probability of employment conditional on explanatory 
variables and Φ(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function. As pointed 
98 16 _17it it it it it itE D D treatment Xα λ β θ ε= + + + +





out by Puhani (2008), the ETT in a model such as this is identified by the 
expression5 
  [3] 
As suggested by this same author, we estimate the standard errors of this 
term using the Delta method. That is, the variance in the ETT can be written 
as 
   [4] 
where G denotes the gradient of equation [3] with respect to the parameters 
and V is the covariance matrix of the parameters of model [2].   
 The effect of the policy on unemployment is studied using an 
analogous model. We estimate the impact of the increase in youth MW on 
unemployment probability conditional to being active (that is, in the labour 
force, either employed or unemployed). We cannot correct for the possible 
bias associated with selection into activity, as we could not find a suitable 
exclusion restriction for the selection equation (a variable affecting the 
probability of being in the labour force but independent of the probability of 
unemployment conditioned on activity). Therefore, our results can only be 
considered representative of the active population. 
( ) ( )it itETT X Xα λ β θ α λ θ= Φ + + + −Φ + +





 Finally, in a specification very similar to the previous ones we also 
try to assess the effect of the increase in youth MW on the probability of 
staying in school.  
 The standard definitions of employment and unemployment 
correspond to those stated by the International Labour Organization. In 
order to test for the robustness of the results, firstly, we consider two 
definitions of employment (including and excluding employers, the self-
employed and family workers from the sample) and unemployment 
(including and excluding discouraged workers in the group of unemployed 
individuals). In addition, we use alternative control groups comprising 
young people aged between 18-20 and 18-24 years old. 
 
5. RESULTS 
The main descriptive statistics of the analysis are presented in Table 3. As 
can be inferred from the Table, the number of observations involved in the 
analysis is large. In the case of the analysis of employment, people who are 
in conscription are excluded, while they are considered in the case of 
education (as being enrolled in formal education was one of the possible 
causes for postponement of military service). Note that the number of 
groups considered is two (a treated and an untreated one), so it is not 





two-group case, as suggested by Wooldridge (2006; 18), this issue (the 
impossibility of clustering in order to take into account within-group 
correlation) is indistinguishable from the parallel trend assumption present 
in any difference-in-differences analysis (that is, we cannot be sure that any 
observed difference in means is entirely caused by the policy change). 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
The results of the difference-in-differences analysis are displayed in 
Table 4. Firstly, the raw difference-in-differences (given by the LPMs) 
indicates a negative effect of the rise in MW on employment (-1.9 
percentage points) and enrolment in formal education (-1.6 percentage 
points) and a positive impact on unemployment (2.5 percentage points). 
Secondly, the adjusted difference-in-differences estimates reveal that the 
direction of such impacts holds once we control for a set of observable 
characteristics. The effect on employment is significant and negative at the 
1% level, at -3 percentage points in the LPM and -2.6 percentage points in 
the probit model, while the positive effect on unemployment, significant at 
the 5% level, is roughly 3 percentage points in both models. Finally, the rise 
in the MW seems to have negatively affected the probability of being in 
formal education. The LPM estimate, significant at the 1% level, suggests a 
negative impact of 1.6 points on enrolment, whereas the probit estimate, 





The estimate parameters suggest an employment-MW elasticity of 
roughly -0.5 (using the probit results), a figure that is slightly above the 
findings for the Portuguese case reviewed in the second section of the paper. 
As employment rates among the affected group were extremely low (below 
10%) at the time of the intervention, it is also informative to compute the 
semi-elasticity (that is, the change in employment in percentage points 
divided by the percentage change in the MW). The corresponding figure is 
remarkably lower: -0.05 (from the probit estimate). 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we repeat the analysis 
considering a wider control group, people aged between 18 and 24 years 
old, and we conduct the analysis for an alternative definition of the 
employed population that excludes employers, the self-employed and family 
workers and an alternative concept of unemployment that includes 
discouraged workers among the unemployed instead of among the inactive 
population. The results of these calculations are presented in Table 5 and 
they corroborate the significance level, sign and magnitude of the estimates 
in Table 4. 







This article has analysed the effect of MW on employment, 
unemployment and education enrolment among people aged 16 and 17 in 
Spain. We have exploited a natural experiment provided by the existence of 
a lower MW for this group up to 1995, when, over three years, it was raised 
to reach full convergence with the standard MW. The empirical analyses, 
based on the difference-in-differences methodology and taking the 
population between 18 and 20 years old as the control group, show that this 
policy intervention had a detrimental effect of around three percentage 
points on employment among the affected group, raised unemployment by 
roughly 2 percentage points and diminished school enrolment barely 1.5 
percentage points. In order to test the robustness of the results of the main 
analysis we repeated the analyses using an alternative control group (18-24 
year olds) and alternative definitions of employment and unemployment. In 
all cases, the results obtained have held for both LPM and probit 
specifications. 
 The evidence presented in the paper is quite consistent with the 
findings of Pereira (2003) for Portugal but is at odds with the results of 
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) for New Zealand. The main corollary of the 





have contributed to perpetuate the high rates of school failure and early 
school leaving and to depress the labour market opportunities of this group. 
                                                            
1 As mentioned, the literature is very extensive. See, among many others, the evidence 
collected and reviewed by Card and Krueger (1995), Boeri and van Ours (2008), Neumark 
and Wascher (2008) and Vaughan-Whitehead (2010). 
2 It has to be acknowledge, though, that in low productivity sectors ( eg. retail) a youth MW 
set too low may risk displacement of adults paid a higher adult MW. 
3 Reducing school drop-out rates to below 10% is one of the targets for the Europe 2020 
Strategy of the European Union, for example. 
4 For more details on the questionnaire and methodology of the EAPS see National 




5 Note that the caution in the estimation of the parameter for interaction terms in nonlinear 
models highlighted by Ai and Norton (2003) does not apply here. As argued by Puhani 
(2008), the cross difference is not equal to the treatment effect, which is the incremental 
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Table 1. OECD countries with different minimum wages for youth 
Countries Age and  % of standard MW wage 
Australia 
16 years old: 50%        17 years old: 60% 
18 years old: 70%        19 years old: 80% 
20 years old: 90% 
Belgium 
< 17 years old: 70 %      17 years old: 76% 
18 years old: 82%        19 years old: 88% 
20 years old: 94% 
Czech Republic  With less than 6 month in the job and <21 years old: 90 % 
France 
With less than 6 month in the job: 
< 17 years old: 80 % 
17 years old: 90 % 
Ireland 
< 18 years old: 70% 
18 years old and over and first job or continuation in 
employment: first year, 80 %; second year, 90 %. 
 Korea < 18 years old: 90%  reduced rate the first 6 months 
Luxembourg < 17 years old : 75% 17 years old: 80% 
Netherlands 
15 years old: 30 %        16 years old: 34.5% 
17 years old: 39.5%      18 years old: 45.5%  
19 years old: 52.5%      20 years old: 61.5% 
21 years old: 72.5%      22 years old: 85% 
New Zealand < 18 years old: 80% 
Poland < 18 years old: 85 % 
Slovak Republic < 18 years old: 75% 
Turkey < 16 years old: 85% 
United Kingdom  16-17 years old: 61 % 18-20 years old: 82 % 
United States < 20 years old, 41 % during the first 90 days* 
* The 1996 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standard Act allow employers to pay a youth minimum wage of not 
less than US$4.25 an hour, compared with the standard Federal MW of US$7.25 an hour in 2010. 








Table 2. Increase in standard and youth MW 1995-1998 
 Workers aged 16 and 17 Workers aged 18 and over 
Nominal increase 1995-1998 (%) 64.2 8.5 
CPI increase 1995-1998 (%)  7.5  7.5 
Real increase 1995-1998 (%) 56.7 1.0 
Minimum wage in 1995 (current Euros per month) 249 377 
Minimum wage in 1998 (current Euros per month) 409 409 







Table 3. Main descriptive statistics of the database 
 Total population between 16 and 20 years old 
People aged 16 and 17 
years old 
People aged between 18 
and 20 years old 





Employed (over people not 
conscripted) 0.163 0.369 0.090 0.286 0.209 0.407 
Employed (alternative definition) 0.139 0.346 0.073 0.261 0.180 0.384 
Unemployed 0.462 0.499 0.508 0.500 0.448 0.497 
Unemployed (alternative definition) 0.461 0.498 0.505 0.500 0.447 0.497 
In formal education (over total 
population) 0.582 0.493 0.694 0.461 0.515 0.500 
Aged 16 or 17 years old 0.377 0.485 --- --- --- --- 
Year 1998 0.477 0.499 0.470 0.499 0.482 0.500 
Treated 0.177 0.382 0.470 0.499 0.000 0.000 
Age 18.1 1.4 16.5 0.5 19.0 0.8 
Squared age 328.8 50.9 273.1 16.5 362.6 31.2 
Female 0.489 0.500 0.489 0.500 0.488 0.500 
No education 0.022 0.146 0.020 0.140 0.023 0.149 
Primary education 0.083 0.276 0.102 0.302 0.072 0.259 
Upper Secondary education 0.331 0.471 0.134 0.340 0.450 0.498 
University education 0.002 0.043 0.000 0.008 0.003 0.054 
Married 0.014 0.119 0.006 0.080 0.019 0.137 
Household size 4.7 1.3 4.7 1.3 4.7 1.4 
Squared household size 23.7 15.4 23.7 15.2 23.7 15.5 
Number of children aged 5 years old 
or less 0.075 0.302 0.087 0.320 0.068 0.291 
Number of children aged between 6 
and 15 years old 0.537 0.726 0.647 0.772 0.470 0.689 
       
Observations 127,380 40,317 79,063 







Table 4. Results of the econometric analysis 
 Raw difference-in-differences Adjusted difference-in-differences 
Effect on employment     
LPM -0.019 *** -0.030 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  
R2 0.025 0.344 
Probit -0.011 *** -0.026 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
Pseudo-R2 0.030 0.154 
Observations  123,955 123,955 
Effect on unemployment     
LPM 0.025 * 0.030 ** 
 (0.015)  (0.014)  
R2 0.008 0.040 
Probit 0.026 * 0.031 ** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  
Pseudo-R2 0.006 0.029 
Observations 36,497 36,497 
Effect on being enroled in formal education     
LPM -0.016 *** -0.016 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  
R2 0.033 0.141 
Probit -0.010 * -0.013 * 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  
Pseudo-R2 0.024 0.110 
Observations 127,380 127,380 
Note:  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Robust standard errors between parentheses. In the probit models, standard errors of the difference-in-differences 
estimates are computed using the Delta method.  
In probit models, we report the marginal effect evaluated at regressors’ averages. 
Control variables in the adjusted difference-in-differences model include gender, age, squared age, marital status, 
household size, squared; household size, number of children aged 5 years old or under in the household, number of 
children aged between 6 and 15 years in the household, region and quarter. In addition, in the case of employment 
and unemployment, the econometric specification also comprises the level of education completed by individuals.  







Table 5. Results of the econometric analysis for alternative definitions of employment and 
unemployment and a different control group 
 Raw difference-in-differences Adjusted difference-in-differences 
Effects on employment (alternative 
definition)     
LPM -0.017 *** -0.027 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Probit -0.007 ** -0.020 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
Effects on unemployment (alternative 
definition)     
LPM 0.025 * 0.030 ** 
 (0.015)  (0.014)  
Probit 0.026 * 0.031 ** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  
Control group: people aged 18-24 years old     
Effect on employment     
LPM -0.029 *** -0.042 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Probit -0.013 *** -0.042 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.007)  
Effect on unemployment     
LPM 0.020  0.024 * 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  
Probit 0.023 * 0.028 ** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  
Effect on being enroled in formal education     
LPM -0.013 ** -0.014 ** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  
Probit -0.009 * -0.015 ** 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  
Note:  
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Robust standard errors between parentheses. In the probit models, standard errors of the difference-in-differences 
estimates are computed using the Delta method.  
In probit models, we report the marginal effect evaluated at regressors’ averages. 
Control variables in the adjusted difference-in-differences model include gender, age, squared age, marital status, 
household size, squared; household size, number of children aged 5 years old or under in the household, number of 
children aged between 6 and 15 years in the household, region and quarter. In addition, in the case of employment 
and unemployment, the econometric specification also comprises the level of education completed by individuals.  
Source: Authors’ analysis from EAPS 1995 and 1998. 
 
